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American Union; and if the rule is rationally examined in all its bearings and
aspects, we can come to no other conclusion than that the rulings of the court in
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ACTION.
Privity of Contract-DamagesforBreach.-The owner of property
in a city, which is destroyed by fire, cannot maintain an action to recover damages for its loss, from a water company, on the ground that
the loss occurred through a failure of the company to furnish water as
required by the terms of its contract with the city, there being no"
privity of contract between the parties to such action : Davis v. Clinton
Water Works Co., 54 Iowa.
Filling up Artificial Ditch by Railway Company.-The fact that a
railway company, in constructing its road-bed, has filled up an artificial
ditch on the land of a third person, by which surface water was conducted from plaintiff's premises to a river, and has thus turned back
the water upon said premises, is no cause of action : ' Connor T. The
Fond du Lac, Amboy and PeoriaRailway Co., 54 Iowa.
AMENDMENT.

See Equity.

ASSUMPSIT.

Services rendered to one on request of another.-Where the testimony shows that A., a physician, is called by B. to render professional
services, without any specification as to whom or on whose account such
services are to be rendered, and in response thereto goes to B.'s house
and fenders such services in medical attention to one who is the father
of B. and a member of his family, all the time looking to B. alone for
compensation, and after the services are rendered presents his bill therefor to B., who makes no objection thereto, but promises to pay it: Held,
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1880. The cases will probably be reported in 13 Otto.
2 From Hon. John S. Runnells, Reporter; to appear in 54 Iowa Reports.
3 From A. M. F. Randolph, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 25 Kansas Reports.
4 From Thomas K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 72 Mo. Reports.
I From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 52 Wis. Reports.
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that such testimony makes out a prima facie case against B. for the
amount of the bill: Hentig v. Keruke, 25 Kans.
ATTORNEY.

Knowledge of Attorney as affecting his Client.-Knowledge acquired
by an attorney while acting for one client, will not affect another client
for whom he is acting at the same time in a different case; Ford v.
French, 72 Mo.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Signature by two Makers.-A promissory note in the form, "I promise to pay, &c.," signed by two or more persons, is joint and several:
Dill v. White, 52 Wis.
Negotiable Note with Mortgage as Collateral.-Where a mortgage on
real estate is given to secure the payment of a negotiable note, and
before the maturity of the note, the note and mortgage are transferred
by endorsement thereon to a bona fide holder, the mortgagor, although
having no notice whatever of such assignment and transfer, cannot
thereafter pay off the note or mortgage to the mortgagee so as to defeat
the real owner and holder thereof from recovering. Such a holder
takes the mortgage as he did the note: Burhaus v. Hutcheson et al.,
25 Kans.
The bonafide holder of negotiable paper transferred to him by endorsement thereon before maturity, and secured by real estate mortgage,
need not record the assignment of the mortgage, or bring home to the
mortgagor actual notice of such assignment, in order to protect himself
against payments made after the assignment without his knowledge or
consent by the mortgagor to the mortgagee : Id.
Fraud as a Defence- Order of Evidence.-When the maker of a
negotiable note proves that the instrument had its origin in fraud, or
was fraudulently put in circulation, it is incumbent upon the holder,
before he can recover, to prove that he received it bonafide, before
maturity and for value : Johnson v. .McMurry, 72 Mo.
The proper order of proof in such cases is for the plaintiff, after defendant has offered his evidence of fraud, to meet it by evidence of bona
fide.3 on his part. He is not required, however, to prove that he had
no knowledge of the specific facts which impeach its original validity;
but may make general proof that he received it before due, bonafide
and for value. It will then be for defendant to prove that plaintiff had
actual notice of the specific facts; and if he fails in this plaintiff must
recover: Id.
COLLATERAL SECURITY.

CONSIDERATION.

See Bills and Notes.

See Debtor and Creditor.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Railroad.

CONTRACT.

illegal Agreement-Part Performance-Recovery of Money paid in
pursuance of-Subscription to Stock proposed to be issued in violation
of State Statutes.-Money paid by one party to another in part performance of an illegal contract not malum in se, can be reco-vered back if the
other party has not performed the contract, and both parties have aban-

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

doned it before consummation:Term
Congress
1880. & Empire Spring Co. v
Knowlton, S. C. U. S., October
A corporation proposed to issue new stock and invited subscriptions
from its original stockholders, promising to issue to each subscriber a full
paid certificate upon payment of eighty per cent. of his subscription
This plan was in violation of state statutes and therefore void. One of
the stockholders, who was an officer of the company, but who had
no knowledge of the illegality of the scheme, subscribed for the additional stock and paid to the company twenty per cent. of his subscription. The plan was afterwards abandoned. Held, that the stockholder
could recover from the corporation the money paid : Id.
Agreement between Father and Son for Conveyance in Consideration
of Service and Support-Specific Performane.-A father and son
agreed together that if the son would remain with and support the
father and his wife (the son's step-mother) during their lives, and work
the farm under the father's directions, the farm should, at his death.
belong to the son. The son, on his part, carried out the agreement
during a period of seventeen years, and until both the father and stepmother were dead. The father, for the purpose of carrying out the
agreement on his part, made and delivered to the son a will devising
the farm to him. The will made no mention of the testator's other
children, and for that reason was void. Held, that the son was entitled
to have the agreement enforced against the other children. The failure
of the attempt to carry it out by will could not be allowed to prejudice
his rights: Hiatt v. Williams, 72 Mo.
CORPORATION.

See Contract.

CRIMINAL LAW. See Juror.
Evidence-Privilegeof Witness.-The refusal of a witness in a criminal trial to answer a question, upon the ground that he may thereby
criminate himself, cannot be shown as a circumstance against him in a
subsequent trial of the witness for the same offence: State v. Bailey,
54 Iowa.
Evidence of one Offence on Trialfor Another.-Upon the trial of one
offence, evidence of an entirely distinct offence is inadmissible; but if
the evidence tends to prove the commission of the offence for which the
prisoner stands indicted, it is no valid objection to it that it also tends
to prove another and distinct offence. Thus, where the two offences are
committed at the same place and within a few minutes of each other,
under such circumstances as together to constitute a single and continuous accomplishment of a fixed and common design, evidence of both
is admissible upon a trial for one : State v. Greenwade, 72 Mo.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

FraudulentGrant- Considerationpaid by Grantee--Moralobligation
to Pay.-One who takes a voluntary absolute conveyance of valuable
property, knowing that the grantor is largely in debt and unable to pay
his debts without subjecting such property to their payment, is guilty
of a fraud in the law against the creditors of his grantor, and the conveyance is void as against them: First National Bank v. Bertschy,
52 Wis.
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The fact that the grantee of land in such a case assumes to pay a subsisting mortgage on the land, which is confessedly worth a much larger
sum than the mortgage debt, does not deprive the conveyance of its
volulitary character as respects the mortgagor's remaining interest in the
land: M.
If the maker of a note, which does not specify the rate of interest,
has orally agreed to pay a higher rate (not usurious or unusual) than
the note would otherwise bear, his payment of such agreed rate is not
a fraud as against his creditors : Id.
A mortgage of land is not in fraud of creditors if given to secure
payment of sums which the mortgagor has promised to pay the mortgagee, where the invalidity of the promise arises merely from the fact
that it is not in such form or evidenced in such manner as the law
requires: Id.
Where A. loans moneys to sons of B. without any request or knowledge on B.'s part, and without any reasonable expectation on A.'s part
that B. will repay such loans if the sons do not, there is no moral obligation upon B. to repay the loans or any part of them; and a subsequent promise of B. to pay them, without any request from the borrowers
that he will guaranty the payment in order to get an extension of time,
is without consideration, and is void, whether made in writing or in parol,
and is not a sufficient consideration to uphold a subsequent transfer of
B.'s property to A., as against creditors: d.
The mere fact that, some eighteen years before such loans were made,
B. had in fact repaid a loan made by A. to another son, under like circumstances, remarking that "he did not want A. to lose anything on
his (B.'s) sons," held, not sufficient evidence that the subsequent loans
were made with any reasonable expectation that B. would repay them
if his sons did not: Id.
A subsequent loan was made by A. to another son of B., under circumstances which satisfy this court that it was procured by such son
from A. by direction of B., and with a reasonable belief on A.'s part
that B. would pay it if the borrower did not; but there was no written
promise and therefore no legal obligation on B.'s part. The son failed
to repay the loan. Held, that B. might treat it as a debt due from him
to A., and pay it by a transfer of property to A. in preference to other
creditors : Id.
No actual intent to defraud being shown, and there being a valuable
consideration for the deed here in question, but not sufficient to uphold
it as an absolute conveyance, against creditors, it is treated in equity as
a security for the sums due from the grantor to the grantee: Id.
ECTMENT. See Equity.
EQUITY.
Ejectment- Change of Legal to Equitable Cause of Action.-One in
the actual and exclusive possession of real estate, cannot maintain 9jectment against a person not in possession, who claims title thereto: Carmichael v. Argard,52 Wis.
A complaint setting up a purely legal cause of action (as one in ejectment), cannot be amended (either as of course or by leave) so as to set
up a cause of action in equity (as one to remove a cloud upon title): Id.
The right to change the action from one purely legal to one purely
VOL. XXIX.T-70
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equitable cannot be claimed under sect. 2832, R. S., on the ground of
mistake, where there was no mistake of facts, but merely an erroneous
belief of counsel that upon the ficts a legal action would.lie: Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.

United States Supreme Court- Writ of E~rror to-Cannotissue from
State Court- What Defects not Aviendable.-A writ of error to the
Supreme Court of the United States, issued in the name of the chief
justice of the Supreme Court of a state, bearing the teste of that chief
justice, signed by the clerk of the state courts and sealed with its seal,
is void, not being in conformity with sect. 1004 Rev. Stat., and its
defects cannot be remedied by amendment under sect. 1005 Rev. Stat:
Bondurant v. Watson, S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
ESTOPPEL.

See Municipal Bonds; Railroad.
EVIDENCE.

Material Alterationin Written Instrument-Burdenof EWplaining.When a material alteration is apparent on the face of a written instrument offered in evidence, the question as to the time of such alteration
is in the last instance, one for the jury. It is like any other fact in the
case, to be settled by the trier or triers of the facts. Generally, in such
a case, the instrument may be given in evidence, and may go to the jury,
or trier of fact upon ordinary proof of its execution, leaving the parties
to such explanatory evidence of the alteration as they may choose to
offer: .Neil, Adm'rx v. Case, 25 Kans.
EXECUTION.
FRAUD.

See Sheriff.

See Debtor and Creditor

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Sufficiencs of Written Afemorandum.-A written memorandum of an
agreement is not sufficient within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds
and Perjuries, that is merely a piece of paper containing the date thereof, the name of the place where written, the names of certain parties and
figures, and signed by the party intended to be charged thereby: Reid
v. Kenworthy, 25 Kans.
While the form of the memorandum is not material, it must state the
contract with reasonable certainty, so as the substance can be made to
appear and be understood from the writing itself; or by direct reference
intrinsic instrument or writing, without having recourse to
to some
parol proof: Id.
INFANT. See Railroad.
Executory Contract-Disaffirmanceon Coming of Age.-An infant's
executory contract is ordinarily voidable; that is, he may, if he choose,
refuse to execute and comply with its provisions, and may at any time
when he is sued upon it before he comes of age, or within a reasonable
time thereafter, disaffirm the same. But after he becomes of the age
of twenty-one years, he cannot disaffirm his contract, without returning
to the other party what he may have received under it, if he then still
possesses or had within his control what he so received: Burgett v. Barrick, 25 Kans.
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The language, "capable of contracting," in sect. 3, c. 67, p. 553,
Comp. Laws 1879, is to be understood as "legally capable of contracting,"
and not that a minor is mentally and physically capable of contracting: Id.
INSURANCE.

State Superintendent- Vesting in, of Assets of Dissolved CompanyRight to Sue in another State-Removal of Causes.-A superintendent
of the insurance department of a state in whom, under the laws of the
state, all the assets of a dissolved insurance company vest in fee-simple
for the benefit of those interested therein, may, as the statutory successor
of the corporation, sue or become party to a suit in another state relating
to assets of the company; and may, on account of his not being a citizen of the state in which suit was brought, remove the case to the
federal courts: The Life Associationof America v. Rundle, S. C. U. S.,
October Term 1880.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Interpretation of Statute- Questions of Law and Fact-While in
order to determine the true scope and meaning of a statute, its letter is
to be first examined and considered, yet courts should also have regard
to the evil sought to be remedied, for that which is within the letter
though not within the spirit of the statute is not in legal contemplation
a part of it: State v. Holmes, and State v. Rowley, 25 Kans.
Til evil sought to be remedied by said chapter 128 was the use of
intoxicating liquors as a beverage. This purpose interprets the law:
Id.
Whatever is generally and popularly known as intoxicating liquor,
such as whiskey, brandy, gin, &e., is within the prohibitions and regulations of the statute, and may be so declared as matter of law by the
courts: Id.
Whatever, on the other hand, is generally and popularly known as
medicine, an article for the toilet, or for culinary purposes, recognised,
and the formula for its preparation prescribed in the United States Dispensatory, or like standard authority, and not among the liquors ordinarily used as intoxicating beverages ; such as tincture of gentian, pare
goric, bay rum, cologne, essence of lemon, &c., is without the statute,
and may be so declared as matter of law by the courts, and this notwithstanding such articles contain alcohol, and in fact and as charged may
produce intoxication: .d.
As to articles intermediate between these two classes, articles not
known to the United States Dispensatory or other similar standard
authority, compounds of intoxicating liquors with other ingredients,
whether put up upon a single prescription and for a single case, of compounded upon a given formula and sold under a specific name as bitters,
cordials, tonics, &c., whether they are within or without the statute is a
question of fact for a jury and not of law for the court. The rule or
test is this : If the compound or preparation be such that the distinctive
character and effect of intoxicating liquor is gone, that its use as an
intoxicating beverage is practically impossible by reason of the other
ingredients, then it is outside of the statute. But if, on the other hand,
the intoxicating liquor remain as a distinctive force in the compound,
and such compound is reasonably liable to be used as an intoxicating
beverage, then it is within the statute : Id.
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JUROR.

Not Disqualified by having read Newspaper Reports.-A person is
not disqualified from serving as a juror by reason of the fact that he
has read newspaper accounts of the case, which created impressions that
would require evidence to remove: State v. Greenwade, 72 Mo.
MANDAMUS.

For what purpose not used-Discretion of Court below-Refusal of
Attachment aaainst Witness.-A writ of mandamus will not be issued
to an inferior tribunal to reverse its decision, refusing a motion for an
attachment against a witness who has disobeyed a subpcsna duces tecum:
.E parte Burtis, S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
MORTGAGE.

See Bills and Notes.

MUNICIPAL BONDS.

Irregularityin Election-Subsequent Issue of New Bonds-Estoppel.
-After a county has issued new bonds in place of bonds issued in aid
of a railroad under a valid law, it is estopped from setting up an irregularity in the calling of the election at which the vote was taken, authorizing the issue of the original bonds: County of Jasper v. Ballou, S. C.
U. S., October Term 1880.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Nuisance--Failure to carry off Drainage.-A city in grading its
streets, and constructing gutters thereon for carrying off surface water,
is not bound to provide against extraordinary storms such as private
persons of ordinary prudence do not usually anticipate and provide
against : Allen v. City of Chippewa Falls, 52 Wis.
Negligence- Contributory- When, a Question of Law.-When the
facts are undisputed, the question of negligence is one of law: Mc.Laury
v. 0ity of McGrego", 54 Iowa.
Where the plaintiff, while walking upon a sidewalk five feet in width,
and while in the enjoyment of sufficient light and such eyesight as to
enable her to discern the limits of the walk, stepped off into a ditch and
was injured, it was held that she was guilty of contributory negligence,
precluding a recovery from the city: Id.
Occupation of Streets by Railroads- Use of Steam Motors in Streets
Negligence.-In an action against a city to recover for personal injuries
caused by -the frightening of plaintiff's horse by a steam motor, used upon
in the
a street railway by permission of the city council, it was held that,
authorize
to
power
no
has
city
a
authority,
absence of express statutory
or permit the use of steam motors upon its streets, either upon ordinary
railroads or street railways, and the grant of such authority or permission constitutes negligence, which will render the city liable for damages
caused thereby: Stanley v. The City of Davenport, 54 Iowa.
The fact that the action of the city council in granting such a right
cotwas without authority would not protect the city from liability,
done
agents
and
officers
their
of
acts
the
for
responsible
being
porations
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within the apparent scope of their authority, and the streets of a city
being under the control of the city council : Id.
ADAMS, J., dissenting, holds that the use of a street for the operation
of a street railway thereon, is not open to the same objection as its use
for the purposes of an ordinary railroad, but is a legitimate use for street
purposes: that it may as such be permitted by the city council under
their general power to regulate the use of streets, and that they may
properly allow the use thereon of cars drawn by horses, steam power or
such other motors as in their judgment will best subserve the public
convenience: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Municipal Cbrporation; .Railroad.
Agent to Collect Draft Accompanying Bill of Ladingfor GrainDeposit of Grainin Drawee's Elevator- Question for Jury.-A bank
received a draft, accompanied by a bill of lading for grain, with
instructions to deliver to the drawees upon payment of the draft.
The drawees were the proprietors of a grain elevator, and the bank, after
acceptance, but before payment of the draft, endorsed on the bill of
lading an order on the carrier to deliver the grain at the drawee's elevator, for account of, and subject to the order of the bank, which was
done. The drawees sold the grain and failed before payment of the
draft. In an action against the bank by the sender'of the draft, Held,
that the above facts constituted evidence of negligence, upon which
the question of the bank's liability should have been submitted to the
jury: Milwaukee Nat. Bank v. City Bank, S. 0. U. S., October Term
1880.
NOTICE. See Attorney.
OFFICER.

Bond-Surery-Regularityof Election.-After a public officer has
served through his term, neither he nor his sureties can escape liability
upon his bond on the ground of the illegality of his election: Boone
County v. Jones et al., 54 Iowa.
The sureties upon the bond of- a public officer can make no defence
that could not be made by their principal: Id.
Defacto Ojfficer-Contract-Election.-Therule as to the validation
of the acts of de facto officers is one of policy, and may be applied, not
only where there is no dejure officer, but where the legal office itself no
longer exists. Where the person claiming to hold the office is not a
mere usurper, but owing to a mistake of fact held under a perfect color
of right, which justified men in concluding that he was a legal officer
holding a legal office, and where the fact that the office was abolished
remained for a long time unknown owing to a false announcement of
election returns, his acts a such officer, done after the abolition of the
office and before the fact was known, may be validated for the purpose
of supporting contracts made with him where money and labor have
been expended on the faith of his authority to act and contract as such
officer: Adams v. Lindell, 72 Mo.
PARENT AND CHILD.

Maintenance of Child-Step-Child.-While in general a parent is
bound to maintain and educate his children at his own expense, yet,
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where the circumstances of the parties are such as to render it necessary or proper, the courts may make an allowance to the parent from the
child's property to defray in whole or in part the expense of his maintenance: Gerdes v. Weiser, 54 Iowa.
Where a man receives into his family, as a member thereof, the child
of his wife by a former marriage, he stands in loco parentis to such
child, and is bound for its support the same as though it were his own
PAUPER.

Aid furnished by County-Recoveryfor,from Estate.-The aid furnished by a county to a pauper is a charity to which the latter is entitled under the statute, and there is no promise implied on his part to
reimburse the county therefor, nor will the fact that such aid is furnished give the county a right of action against the estate of the rPcipiet: Bremer County v. Curtis, 54 Iowa.
PRACTICE.

Nunc pro tune Entries.-In the absence of anything to show that an
order or judgment, as made by the court, was different from that actually entered, no correction can be made in the latter by a nuncpro tune
entry at a subsequent term. A mere erroneous judgment cannot be thus
corrected: Fetters v. Baird, 72 Mo.
RAILROAD. See Action.
Sale of State Bonds IExchanged for Railroad Bonds- Unconstitutionality of State Bonds-Estopelof Railroadfrom alleging-Enforcement of Statutory Lien to Secure- Constitutionalityof.Partof StatuteRights ofbonafidefHolderof Bonds.-A statute authorized a state to issue
its bonds to a railroad company in exchange for the latter's bonds, and
gave to the state as security, therefbr, a statutory lien on the road in the
Under this statute, the company issued
nature of a first mortgage.
bonds and exchanged them for state bonds, which were afterwards
fraudulently disposed of by the officers of the company, and sold to bona
fide purchasers. Each of the state bonds contained an endorsement by
the governor, reciting, that it was secured by first mortgage bonds of the
railroad. The state courts afterwards decided, that the state bonds were
unconstitutional and void. Upon a suit by holders of the state bonds to
enforce the statutory lien given as security therefor, Held, that the
question as to the unconstitutionality of the bonds, was peculiarly within
the province of the state courts, whose decision would not be departed
from by the federal courts, except for imperative reasons. Heldfurther,
that although the bonds were void as to the state, yet the railroad company were, under the circumstances, estopped from denying their validity.
Heldfurther, that the part of the statute giiing a statutory lien for the
money borrowed, could be sustained, notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the part authorizing the issue of state bonds therefor.
Held further, that the bonafide holders of the bonds, were not confined
in their recovery against the railroad to the amounts paid by them for
the bonds: Florida Central Railroad Co. v. Schutte, S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
Negligence.-In an action by C. against a railroad company, for injuries
caused through the negligence of the railroad company, it is error for the
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court to give an instruction to the jury, which makes the conduct of the
plaintiff the only condition upon which his right of recovery depends;
and which virtually says, that if the plaintiff was careful and prudent
that he may recover, whether the defendant was negligent or not: Atchiion, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Combs, 25 Kans.
lnf'nt-Injury to while on the Track-Question of Contributory
Negligene.-Where a child two years old strays away from his home,
without the knowledge or consent of his parents, and goes upon a railroad track, which is about one hundred feet from his home, and within
three minutes after leaving his home he is injured by a car belonging
to the railroad company, running over him. Hel, that it cannot be
said, as a matter of law, that the failure of the parents to keep the child
away from the railroad track, was per se culpable negligence contributing to the injury. Smith v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad
Co.. 25 Kans.
Where a railroad track is constructed in a populous neighborhood,
near a city, and children and others often go upon the track, and a portion of the track has a steep grade down which cars will run with great
fbrce when the brakes are loosened; and the persons operating the road
loosen the brakes of a car loaded with coal, and let it run down this
steep grade, without any person being on the car, or any means of stopping it, and without first looking to see whether the track was clear, or
whether any person was on the track or not; and a child, who was on
the track, was run over and injured ; and there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether the child could have been seen by the persons operating the road, before they loosened the brakes. Held, that the court
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the persons operating the road were
not guilty of negligence ; but it is a question of fact which should be
submitted to the jury : Id.
Where a railroad company owns a switch track, constructed from the
main track to a coal shaft belonging to a mining company; and the railroad company furnishes cars to this mining company to be loaded with
coal, and when loaded, permits the mining company to loosen the brakes
of the cars, so that the cars will run down the steep grade of the switch
track to a point where the track is level; and the mining company after
loading a certain car, negligently loosens the brakes thereof and allows
the cars to run down the steep grade of the switch track, and over a
child, and thereby injures it. Held, that the railroad company is
responsible for the injury: Id.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

See Insurance.

SHERIFF.

Liability of-Execution-Damaes.-If the attorney for the plaintiff
in an execution, is misinformed by the sheriff's deputy as to the place of
sale, and for that reason fails to attend the sale, and no one is present to
protect the plaintiff's interest, in consequence of which, property
sufficient to pay the debt is sacrificed and plaintiff gets nothing, the
sheriff will be liable to the plaintiff for the loss: State ex rel. Central
Type Foundry v. Moore, 72 Mo.
If a sheriff sees that property which he is offering at execution sale is
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about to be sacrificed, and knows that it was the intention of plaintiff's
attorney to be present and protect plaintiff's interest *y bidding, but sees
that the attorney is absent, and knows that his absence is owing to erroneous information furnished by his own deputy, he should not permit
the sale to go on, but should postpone it; and if he fails to do so, and
the property is sacrificed, he will be liable: Id.
SURETY.

See Officer.

TRADE-MARK.

Words in Common Use-Maker's Name.-Words in common use,
merely descriptive of the character, composition or quality of the article
to which they are applied, cannot be exclusively appropriated and protected as a trade-mark: Marshall v. Pinkhamo 52 Wis.
The office of a trade-mark is to point out the true origin or ownership
of the goods to which it is applied, or to designate the dealer's place of
business: Id.
The ground upon which actions for the infringement of a trade-mark
are maintained is, that the law will not allow one person to sell his own
goods as and for the goods of another: Id.
The fact that an article, prepared according to a certain recipe, but
not protected by a patent, has for some time been made and sold only by
a certain manufacturer, does not render it unlawful for any other person
acquainted with its composition, from manufacturing and selling the
same: Id.
The proper name of the manufacturer of an article, cannot be made a
trade-mark, so as to prevent any other manufacturer of the same name
from affixing such name to a similar article made and sold by him, where
no unfair means are used to mislead purchasers into a belief, that such
article is manufactured by the person who first sold and continues to
sell a like article under that name: Id.
M., having a recipe (not discovered or invented by himself, or protected by a patent) for a liniment used for the cure of rheumatism and
other diseases, communicated it to the various members of his numerous
family; and permitted each of them, for his or her own benefit, to
manufacture the article, and sell it with a certain label attached (furnished by M.) containing the words "Old Dr. M.'s Celebrated Liniment," and certain other words descriptive of the liniment, and a certain
vignette, and with the address of the particular member of the family
manufacturing the article at the bottom of such label. Each member
of the family engaged in such manufacture, appears to have had, by
their mutual agreement, some particular route or routes to which his
sales were confined. After M.'s death, his widow continued for some
years to manufacture the liniment, and to sell it (with said label attached)
on the routes last occupied by M. ; and she then sold the material and
paraphernalia of her business to the plaintiff, one of the sons of M. Held,
that plaintiff has no exclusive right as against the other children of M.,
or their assigns (nor even as against the public generally), to manufacture said liniment, or to the use of said label or the name "Marshall's"
as descriptive of the article sold: Id.

